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Speaks, who came to incarnate the post-critical 
position.3 In 2000, right before that wave, at ‘The 
Pragmatist Imagination’ conference, Pragmatism 
had appeared convenient to mark, accompany, but 
also temper this (upcoming) turn. As a ‘theory of 
practice’, it could potentially counter the domination 
of theory upon practice, without dismissing it alto-
gether. It was supposed to help architects refocus 
on the practical instead of conceptual or discursive 
effects of their production, while preventing them 
from falling into the anti-intellectual and politically 
complicit posture that often characterised such 
dismissal of former critical legacies. It was indeed 
critical theory – and the once fruitful connections 
that architecture had established with Continental 
philosophy in general – that was held responsible 
for the unprecedented schism between theory and 
practice. Pragmatism, the American philosophy, was 
called to serve as an alternative to that influence. 
History – from Continental philosophy to 
Pragmatism, or not
Since the 1960s, exchanges between architec-
ture and various theories formulated by European 
intellectuals had been fertile. Structuralism first, 
but also critical theory from the Frankfurt School 
or, later, post-structuralism, were highly seductive 
to architects and architectural theorists, who used 
their concepts to reflect on architectural form and 
practice, or to experiment with new design tools. 
Apart from their general success on the American 
campus, the very spatial aspect of some of these 
theories explains architects’ direct affinity with 
10 November 2000. The auditorium at the MoMA 
in New York is packed. The audience is patiently 
waiting for the proceedings to start. On the stage, 
a long empty table with five chairs and their asso-
ciated microphones awaits the contributors who 
will confer. On the screen behind that scene, a 
projection exhibits the name of the event: ‘Things 
in the Making, Contemporary Architecture and The 
Pragmatist Imagination’.1 These two days (and 
the preliminary seminar that had taken place at 
Columbia University a few months earlier) were an 
attempt to introduce Pragmatism – the American 
philosophy first defined by Peirce, James and 
Dewey – into architectural discourse.
Joan Ockman – with the help of the philoso-
pher John Rajchman – convened the assembly 
because she thought Pragmatism provided an 
opportunity to address the main issue architectural 
theory had been facing in the last few years: the 
increased schism between theory and practice, and 
the recent eagerness to refocus on practice at the 
expense of theory. This desire for a shift in archi-
tectural thinking – less theory, more practice; less 
discourse, more action; less criticism, more work 
done – is often labelled a ‘post-critical’ moment and 
dated to the first years after the turn of the century.2 
Ockman’s initiative attests that such an idea was 
already flourishing before 2000, but the movement 
indeed reached its peak after the event. More and 
more provocative and irreverent contributions were 
then published, most famously by the American 
theorists Robert Somol, Sarah Whiting and Michael 
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architectural practice in terms of new realities became 
manifest. […] [Pragmatism] might serve as a lever to 
pry open some hardened formations in architecture, 
by now giving signs of having run their course.6
Even though it was convenient to present 
Pragmatism as an alternative, its introduction 
appears to be more of a continuity than a rupture with 
the heritage of Continental philosophy. It occurred 
at the same time as architects’ readings of Deleuze 
and Foucault on the diagram. The main protago-
nist behind this transition was John Rajchman, 
the philosopher who co-organised ‘The Pragmatist 
Imagination’ with Joan Ockman, and who had also 
been a major actor in the introduction of Deleuze in 
architectural theory in the 1990s.7 He explicitly artic-
ulated these two legacies in a paper presented at 
the ‘Any’ conference held in Rotterdam in 1997. The 
paper is entitled ‘A New Pragmatism?’. However, in 
terms of its content, the paper still fully belongs to a 
scene that preceded ‘The Pragmatist Imagination’: 
the latest Deleuzian episode in architectural theory, 
composed of a series of papers published around 
1998 about the possibility of a ‘diagrammatic’ 
architecture. Rajchman’s paper differentiates itself 
mostly because it evokes a connection between the 
Deleuzian/Foucauldian notion of the diagram and 
the less known philosophical tradition defined by 
Peirce, James and Dewey.
The discussion around the opportunity of 
thinking architecture in a diagrammatic way had 
appeared during the 1990s when some architects 
started to read the recent English translations of 
Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault. The diagram can 
be described as one next step after the success of 
the fold, or the virtual, among Deleuzian concepts 
that were sufficiently architectural to be easily 
consumed by architectural theory. In the last years 
of the 1990s, publications revolving around the 
diagram flourished.8 The notion referred not only to 
the increased use of a given mode of representa-
tion or tool for designing buildings and for taking a 
them.4 In a way, the Deleuzian notion of ‘the fold’ 
or the Derridian movement of ‘Deconstruction’ 
were offering themselves to straightforward recu-
perations. But beyond such literal translations, 
architects found something fascinating, intriguing 
and guiding in the complicated and provocative 
language of these philosophers. There was some-
thing appealing in the way they were dismissing the 
old way of practicing philosophy and thinking about 
the world; in the fluid, the ever-changing, the uncer-
tain, the disruptive, the marginal, which they were 
bringing in.
But, by the late 1990s, the connection with 
Continental philosophy seemed to have exhausted 
architectural theory. Some started to disregard 
those architects who had got lost in complicated 
philosophical readings they could not really master. 
Their understanding was too literal, turning concepts 
into formal games and emptying them from their 
political or societal content. Also, architects were 
distracted from their own prerogatives. Despite the 
fact that theory had contributed to architecture’s 
definition as a proper discipline, it was at the same 
time dissolving architecture’s specificity. Again, the 
introduction in architecture of methods, vocabu-
laries, questions, contents coming from other fields 
of the humanities – literary studies, semiotics, 
philosophy, feminism, and so on – reached a point 
where it was considered a threat to architecture’s 
particularity. Among others, Cornel West, a pragma-
tist philosopher who was invited to ‘The Pragmatist 
Imagination’ in 2000, did not hesitate to call this 
phenomenon an ‘invasion’ or ‘occupation’ of archi-
tectural criticism, leading to a loss of its identity.5 In 
her introduction at the conference, Ockman identi-
fied this situation of exhaustion, in order to promote 
Pragmatism as a useful alternative:
Partly in reaction to this situation, but also in the 
climate of a booming economy and plenty of buildings 
coming out of the ground, a desire to reconceptualise 
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Foucault did provides awareness of these mecha-
nisms and a chance to intervene among, between, 
or even against them.
This is what Rajchman insists on in his paper in 
1997. The diagram is used as an alternative to the 
plan or the programme, which were brandished by 
modern architects as a way to tame contingencies. 
The diagram is a chance to map the unpredict-
able, unstable, invisible state of a society at a given 
moment. It provides awareness about the fact 
that phenomena permeate many other levels than 
language: the unsaid, the body, the organisation 
of space… The diagram gives us clues about how 
to act and maybe provides a chance to intervene. 
A step further, Rajchman describes some traits of 
a ‘diagrammatic architecture’, characterised by 
its ability to deal with the uncertain, to instigate 
unpredictable movements and events, to form new 
subjectivities, to make sense without referring to 
something that precedes, and so on.
Despite its deeply theoretical traits, this discus-
sion about the diagram is directly linked to both 
the post-critical scene and the introduction of 
Pragmatism in architecture at ‘The Pragmatist 
Imagination’.13 Rajchman’s paper constitutes 
a major point of overlap between these three 
episodes, both in terms of content and of the refer-
ences he uses. He contributes to what will be called 
a post-critical movement insofar as he sees the 
notion of the diagram as a chance to revise archi-
tects’ ways of being critical, which he finds not only 
in French post-structuralism, but in a larger philo-
sophical tradition, of which American Pragmatism 
forms part:
Perhaps in this way the pragmatism of diagram and 
diagnosis might help transform the sense of what 
is ‘critical’ in our thought and our work. It might help 
move beyond the impasses of older images of nega-
tive theology, transgression, or abstract purity and 
certain amount of data into account. In this specific 
moment, the diagram turned into a concept, found 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, 
but also in Foucault’s writings about Bentham’s 
Panopticon.
In Deleuze and Guattari’s post-structuralist 
program, the diagram forms part of an argument 
about the end of the domination of language, of the 
‘signifying regime’. Deleuze and Guattari propose 
to multiply the regimes of signs under consideration 
and to build up a pragmatics that also considers the 
transformations among them. The diagram is not a 
type of sign; it is one kind of transformation between 
different regimes of signs. It is an ‘abstract machine’, 
an operation characterised by the absence of stabi-
lised form and content, instead organising form 
and content at multiple levels.9 In architecture, the 
diagram is then understood as another way to relate 
to the real than the ‘indexical’ relation that had been 
central since the 1970s, in conceptual art and archi-
tecture:10 instead of referring to the real under the 
form of a trace, a comment or a sign, a diagram-
matic architecture would rather deal with the virtual, 
instigating unforeseen possibilities by working on 
the level of effects to be felt rather than meaning to 
be read.11
Beyond the argument against the domination of 
semiotics, the diagram also relates to a new form 
of socio-historic work, as conducted by Foucault 
about the prison.12 The way Foucault describes the 
Panopticon constitutes an example of what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean when they consider the diagram 
as an abstract machine. The Panopticon is not just a 
plan pointing to the construction of a specific prison, 
nor even just a type of prison, it is also the diagram 
of the disciplinary society at large. Its functioning 
permeates all layers of a society, normalising and 
controlling behaviours. It works not only through 
its institutions (prison, schools, hospitals); it is also 
actualised through individual conduct. To draw the 
diagram of the state of our society in such a way as 
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American philosophy had then taken a positivistic 
turn, due to the influence of the logical positivists of 
the Vienna Circle who had emigrated to the United 
States. American philosophy departments were 
driven away from Pragmatism and began devel-
oping analytic philosophy instead. The general aim 
of analytic philosophy was the logical clarification 
of thoughts, with the help of formal logic and the 
analysis of language. It was based on the premise 
that constructions close to those found in math-
ematics would help provide definite answers to 
given questions. This idea stood in sharp contrast 
with Continental philosophies. Philosophy depart-
ments were largely indifferent to – even protective 
against – the post-structuralist or Marxist waves 
that washed through American campuses in the 
1970s and 80s. At least until some thinkers started 
to propose a parallel history of philosophy, able 
to reconcile analytic and continental philosophy, 
thanks to a third forgotten tradition: Pragmatism. 
Rorty famously contributed to that programme, and 
wrote: ‘On my view, James and Dewey were not 
only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which 
analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the 
end of the road which, for example, Foucault and 
Deleuze are currently traveling’.19 It is that revival 
only – in the form of what Rajchman and West call 
a ‘post-analytic philosophy’ – that led architectural 
theory to establish connections with American 
philosophy. Until then, architectural theory had 
favoured literary (and other fields of) studies, as 
a means of access to the post-modern, inspiring, 
subversive theories coming from Europe. This 
explains, I believe, why, around 2000, architectural 
theory looked into the original Pragmatism of Peirce, 
James and Dewey, as an ‘alternative’ to the influ-
ence of Continental theories, instead of adopting 
analytic philosophy per se. 
Architects were eager to diminish the pretensions 
of theory and to refocus on practice. Architects were 
seeking a fluid and responsive way of dealing with 
shifting realities and fast changes. Some of the 
introduce a new problem: that of resingularizing envi-
ronments, of living an indefinite ‘complexity’, prior to 
set determinations, which questions the simplicities 
and generalities of our modes of being and suggests 
other possibilities.14
Rajchman inscribes this movement into a history of 
philosophy that opposes the critical tradition inher-
ited from Kant to some alternatives, among which 
the direction taken by Pragmatism.15 If Rajchman 
talks about ‘a new pragmatism’ it is because he 
attempts to connect the ideas of Deleuze, Guattari 
and Foucault to those of Peirce, James, and 
Dewey. He considers the French theories about 
the diagram as a ‘diagrammatic pragmatism’, ‘a 
new pragmatism’ which continues what had been 
started by the Pragmatists, but under new condi-
tions. It is in this paper about the diagram that 
Rajchman first introduces the Jamesian notion of 
‘things in the making’ that would prove central at 
‘The Pragmatist Imagination’ in 2000.16 Rajchman 
uses it to insist on the experimental aspect of archi-
tectural practice, and the necessity to develop new 
tools enabling architects to deal with complex and 
unstable situations.
Pragmatism thus makes its appearance in archi-
tecture at the height of the success of French 
theory in the field, and not after or in opposition to 
it, as Ockman argued in 2000 when she introduced 
‘The Pragmatist Imagination’. Actually, the revival 
of Pragmatism in American philosophy is itself 
tightly linked to the influence of Continental philos-
ophy.17 In the late 1970s–early 1980s, American 
philosophy undertook a ‘post-analytical’ shift away 
from the positivistic aims that characterised it for 
decades; that shift was based on a reconciliation 
of Pragmatism and Continental philosophy.18 To 
understand the revival of Pragmatism, one must 
first recall the fact that this philosophy – which 
had been very successful in the United States in 
the second half of the nineteenth century – had 
fallen into oblivion after the Second World War. 
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The absence of Pragmatism – in the form of a 
philosophical legacy – in what directly followed the 
conference constitutes an evident lack of success 
in that milieu:
And the ‘New Pragmatism’? If only it were so! I can 
confidently say that if there were such a thing, the 
able trend-spotting machine of New York architec-
ture culture would have taken it up, and if a critical 
mass of suitable practitioners could be found – I can 
think of two – a show would have been put together, 
a manifesto written, and a catalog published (Two 
Architects?).22
Instead, what followed in this (mostly North-
American) context in the first decade after 2000 
was the crystallisation of a ‘post-critical’ moment. 
The revision of the role of architectural theory in 
favour of a refocus on practice was conducted in 
a more and more irreverent and easy way, and 
with no consistent reference to Pragmatism.23 The 
post-critical opted for the anti-intellectual direction 
that Ockman was precisely trying to avoid when 
she introduced Pragmatism as an alternative. The 
post-critical tone was provocative, not only against 
theory or critique, but also against any form of crit-
ical resistance that would tame the free conduct of 
design practice. 
Because of that, the post-critical gave rise to 
fierce objections. Many feared that such an easy-
going rejection of theory and criticality would set 
architects adrift, as they would blindly rush into 
the pervasive logic of capitalism. Therefore, ‘The 
Pragmatist Imagination’ can retrospectively be 
considered a welcome but unfortunate attempt to 
consider what Pragmatism could have contributed to 
that situation. For a couple of years, James, Dewey 
and Peirce made a few appearances in architec-
tural theory, before they fell back into oblivion, in 
that particular architectural milieu at least.24 Maybe 
Ockman’s diagnosis was too optimistic: the archi-
tects who were seeking an alternative to the strong 
questions at stake were the new, computer-based, 
modes of design; the irruption of media, globalisa-
tion and the emergent cities; or the privatisation of 
public space. Architects were not looking for a more 
precise, truer, way of defining architecture. They 
were not interested in building a philosophy of archi-
tecture with the help of analytic philosophy, which 
would give itself the role of defining what architec-
ture is in an almost scientific way.20 This appears 
very clearly in Stan Allen’s words at ‘The Pragmatist 
Imagination’:
I identify myself with those who don’t ask themselves 
what architecture is or means but only what it can 
do. […] The skepticism for a certain kind of theory is 
legitimate. The questions were mainly of two kinds for 
the theory of the 80s, either ontological or semiotic. 
When the question is ontological, it interrogates the 
origins, the limits, and the specificities of architecture. 
When semiotic, the question is that of meaning and 
representations. […] For my generation, these inter-
rogations were not interesting anymore.21
What was at stake in this architectural milieu in the 
late 1990s was a way to find effective conceptual 
tools able to accompany the complex task of the 
architect, who wanted to fully engage in the building 
of new environments. As with the concept of the 
diagram, the main expectation from Pragmatism 
was in shifting how architecture could make itself 
significant: not by producing a meaningful message 
but by acting in and on the world, by inducing effects, 
on another level than language. Architectural theory 
was also to change its questions: neither what 
architecture means, nor what it fundamentally is, 
but what it does, what it entails. Formulated in these 
terms, the move can indeed be characterised as 
‘pragmatist’.
However, despite Ockman’s and Rajchman’s 
ambitious initiative, ‘The Pragmatist Imagination’ 
did not manage to push this strand of architec-
tural theory into a pragmatist decade after 2000. 
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by implementing a series of curved ‘brackets’ across 
the plan of an otherwise simple box with three floors. 
These ‘figures’ imply that the surface of the façade 
sometimes ribbons towards the inside and that 
the definition of the rooms on each floor is slightly 
disturbed. Somol insists on the fact that ‘the effects 
of the IntraCenter are aimed not toward the produc-
tion of critical exegesis or uncanny self-reflection, 
but strictly toward the generation of anomalous 
ecstasy’.27 They are not meant to be interpreted 
but to generate new subjectivities. Somol does not 
fully reject the critical aspect of architecture – the 
fact that architectural form is imbued with meaning 
that can be interpreted – but he believes that the 
critical has been given too much importance: it 
repressed other ways in which architecture matters 
and inhibited other possibilities for architectural 
experimentation.
The diagrammatic and the post-critical programme 
overlap as they both invite architects to move from 
meaning to effects. The notion of effects is here 
articulated with that of affects. It is understood in 
terms of ‘seduction’, ‘atmosphere’ or even ‘ecstasy’. 
This is also true of other architects who participated 
in the discussion around a diagrammatic architec-
ture. UNStudio, the Dutch firm who edited issue 
23 of ANY Magazine about the diagram in 1998, 
published a volume entitled Effects in their mono-
graph Move just one year after. They explain that 
‘effects are felt, but cannot be grasped […] Being 
active as sensation, effects are not standardized 
and categorized but remain an agitated, undefined 
mass in the territory of the unconscious’.28 The char-
acteristic of effects is that they do not look like what 
provokes them. Therefore, they escape the notion 
of ‘representation’.
This ‘post-representational’ (and ‘post-critical’) 
attitude, which spread in architecture in the late 
1990s, provoked a series of objections. Some 
authors feared that such a posture would entail an 
unabashed formalism. Among these, Roemer Van 
influence of philosophy on the field, were not just 
opposing Continental philosophy, but philosophy in 
general. Pragmatism was no exception.
Speculation – So what about Pragmatism? 
Instead of lamenting this lack of success, I see it 
as an opportunity to consider the initiative anew 
and use it to retroactively make propositions within 
the discussions about criticality. The second part of 
this paper will consider some post-critical proposi-
tions in more detail, and see what kind of responses 
Pragmatism might have provided to the objections 
that were formulated against them. I will focus on 
an issue that spans from the diagrammatic (around 
1998) to the post-critical (around 2002) and through 
‘The Pragmatist Imagination’ (2000). The issue at 
stake in all three scenes is the need for architec-
ture to overcome the notion of ‘representation’ or 
‘meaning’ in favour of its ‘effects’: instead of repre-
senting its condition, expressing its design process, 
telling ideas, commenting on the world, the ‘diagram-
matic’ or ‘projective’ or ‘post-critical’ architecture 
‘focuses upon effects’, ‘is not for reading but for 
seducing’, ‘instigating new events and behaviors’.25
The above-mentioned qualities of a ‘projective’ 
architecture are found in the famous ‘Notes around 
the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism’ 
published by Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting in 
2002, which is often used to mark the advent of 
a post-critical stage in architecture. Ahead of that 
co-authored – and now seminal – paper, Somol 
had already been building on the architecture of 
WW, Whiting’s practice, to describe the turn from 
meaning to effect, which is at stake in what he was 
then calling a turn towards the ‘diagrammatic’ in 
architecture: ‘[it is] not an architecture to pay atten-
tion to (not about its meaning), but an environment 
for acting in, for instigating new events and traits’.26 
In their design for a community centre in Kentucky, 
developed in the late 1990s, WW attempted to blur 
the boundary between the inside and the outside, 
and between different programmes on each floor, 
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from an autonomous architecture – considered 
as mere wordplay or representation – could have 
led to a more conscious architecture, aware of its 
social, political, economical, cultural consequences. 
In ‘Doppler Effect’, Somol and Whiting seem to 
know that risk, when they defensively conclude 
that ‘setting out this projective program does not 
necessarily entail a capitulation to market forces, 
but actually respects or reorganises multiple econo-
mies, ecologies, information systems, and social 
groups’.31 However, that line of defence proved to 
be too weak to prevent the wave of criticism that 
followed. This so-called ‘new architectural pragma-
tism’ was soon accused of being complicit with the 
market economy as it was giving up critical resist-
ance in favour of a posture of acceptance.32
Despite the fact that these projective or post-crit-
ical propositions have eventually been qualified as 
‘a new architectural pragmatism’ and that most of 
their authors were at ‘The Pragmatist Imagination’ in 
2000, American Pragmatism was almost completely 
absent from the discussion. Only a common sense 
‘pragmatism’ remained: the idea that theory had to 
be rejected in favour of practice and that utopias 
or any form of ideals could be discarded in favour 
of an unleashed realism. My hypothesis is that 
Pragmatism – not in its common sense but as a full-
fledged philosophical body of knowledge – could 
have helped in avoiding the reductive appeal to 
effects that was at stake in the ‘new architectural 
pragmatism’. However, the aim is not to imply that 
the post-critical architects were pragmatists who 
just never acknowledged that legacy. The aim is to 
measure affinities as much as contrasts between 
that specific trend in architectural discourse and the 
philosophy with which it did not align at that point. 
The proposition is thus more of a speculation: what 
if these architects had chosen to read Pragmatism? 
What differences would it have made? 
I believe that an alliance with Pragmatism would 
allow a retroactive consideration of the objections to 
Toorn’s critique is particularly severe. In 2004, he 
considers this trend to be ‘the degree zero of the 
political’:
This [projective architecture] is a strategy without 
political ideas, without political or socio-historical 
awareness, that is in danger of becoming the victim of 
a dictatorship of aesthetics, technology and the prag-
matism of the blindly onrushing economy. Instead of 
taking responsibility for the design, instead of having 
the courage to steer flows in a certain direction, the 
ethical and political consequences arising from the 
design decisions are left to the market and the archi-
tect retreats into the givens of his discipline.29
Focused on effects, these architects run the risk of 
neglecting the larger consequences of their design. 
It is in this sense that, in another paper published 
that same year, Van Toorn criticises UNStudio’s 
project for La Defense office complex in Almere. 
The architects designed a series of volumes char-
acterised by the changing colour of their façades; 
Van Toorn explains that this architecture does not 
want to express any meaning, to signal any content, 
to communicate any message, which it would have 
done by representing the identity of the company 
that commissioned the complex for instance. 
Instead, the skin of the building acts as a cosmetic 
layer, ‘a hypnotic seducer’: it organises emotional 
or sensational effects. Van Toorn criticises this 
sort of architecture, because he believes that the 
effects produced are gadget-like, that they serve as 
mere decoration. Therefore, they ‘elicit a committed 
response [in favour of] an intimate experience’, and 
prevent architects from ‘contribut[ing] to certain 
pressing social tasks’.30
The problem lies in the restrictive scope of the 
effects that are considered by these architects: 
instead of looking at the broad consequences 
of their design and the situation in which it takes 
place, architects narrow down their interest to mate-
rial, visual, sensual effects. The movement away 
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Pragmatism was first defined in the late 1870s 
by Charles Sanders Peirce in a two-part paper enti-
tled The Logic of Science. This is where Peirce lays 
out the basis on which Pragmatism is founded: the 
meaning of an idea is found in its ‘practical bearings’ 
or ‘sensible effects’. Peirce reaches this conclusion 
after he explains that research or reasoning always 
starts with a lively doubt that needs to be overcome. 
The aim of any research, of any inquiry, is the fixa-
tion of a belief: doubts need to be tempered, as 
they interrupt the course of actions. For Peirce, the 
aim of thought is thus to assure the conduct of an 
action, the establishment of habits. The meaning of 
an idea thus depends on the habits it produces, on 
the actions it entails, more generally on its ‘sensible 
effects’. As a method to ‘make our ideas clear’, 
Peirce proposes the following rule, which would 
soon become the Pragmatist method: ‘consider 
what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception 
to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object’.33
Twenty years later, William James took this 
maxim and popularised it under the name 
Pragmatism. In 1898, he gave a talk entitled 
‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ 
in which he affirmed that philosophy should deal 
with metaphysical alternatives only if the competing 
terms differ regarding their practical results. If two 
options do not make an actual difference, then the 
alternative is vain and deserves no consideration. 
Pragmatism is thus first a method to escape useless 
metaphysical debates. More generally, it invites us 
to concentrate our thoughts on effects rather than 
causal or essential explanations. 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical 
disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you 
subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete 
consequence. There can be no difference anywhere 
that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere – no differ-
ence in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a 
the post-critical along two lines: (1) to insist on archi-
tecture’s practical effects does not mean that theory 
and discourse need to be dismissed altogether; 
(2) instead of just ‘practical effects’, Pragmatism 
is a philosophy that encourages us to take into 
account consequences on a much larger (and thus 
very demanding) scope. I thus intend to establish 
a contrast between ‘effects’ and ‘consequences’ 
parallel to the distinction between common-sense 
pragmatism and what the philosophy of Pragmatism 
invites us to consider. Despite the fact that these 
two pairs of terms are respectively synonymous 
and homonymous, it seems to me that widening 
the interstice between them opens up an interesting 
space for reflection.
I will explore the way in which the first definitions 
of Pragmatism by Peirce, James and Dewey were 
characterised by a similar spectrum, proceeding 
from effects to consequences. Their respective 
definitions of Pragmatism are known to be increas-
ingly moral and political, as they pass from Peirce’s 
notion of the practical bearings of ideas to James’s 
concern for their particular consequences and 
Dewey’s ideas about their role in the adaptation of 
individuals to their (social) environment. 
It is often said that James took over Peirce’s 
Pragmatism and added a moral dimension to it, 
by using what was at first a method to eventually 
choose among various philosophical conceptions 
(for example, between monism and pluralism). It is 
also clear that Dewey is the most political among 
the pragmatist philosophers, as he was a convinced 
liberal and democrat who thought that the role of 
philosophy was to help social improvement. Also, 
the pragmatist philosophers had to react against 
accusations of instrumentalism, utilitarianism, anti-
intellectualism and even mercantilism. Their own 
writings thus contain lines of defence against these 
claims, which echo the controversies around the 
‘new architectural pragmatism’.
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also of ideas, however remote, abstract or meta-
physical they may be. Therefore, James is far 
from dismissing theory or philosophy. Instead, by 
insisting on their practical bearing, he reaffirms their 
importance. Moreover, far from focusing only on 
direct effects, he insists on further consequences, 
showing what a different world distinct ideas or 
deeds can imply.
James’s Pragmatism brings to light the contrast 
between ‘effects’ and ‘consequences’. Dewey’s 
Pragmatism, even more than James’s, is focused 
on particular situations and, more precisely, on the 
interactions that define them. Consequences, with 
Dewey, are thus considered less on a particular or 
individual level than on a social and political one. 
Dewey underscores Pragmatism’s meliorism. He 
adds to James’s Pragmatism, when he affirms that 
Pragmatism should not only be a philosophical 
tool to choose among different options, but also to 
propose new ones:
[James] wished to force the general public to realize 
that certain problems, certain philosophical debates 
have a real importance for mankind, because the 
beliefs which they bring into play lead to very different 
modes of conduct [… ] Such a statement implies 
that the world formulas have already all been made, 
and that the necessary work of producing them has 
already been finished.37
Dewey argues that Pragmatism cannot be reduced 
to a method, because it has important metaphysical 
implications. The fact that Pragmatism obliges us to 
take future consequences into consideration leads 
to a conception of a universe that is unfinished, 
made of ‘things in the making’, rather than things 
made. Philosophy should thus not only be anchored 
within experience, but also enrich it.
When James defined Pragmatism in his 
famous essay in 1907, he did not only look into 
Peirce’s method but also into Dewey’s logic, his 
difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent 
upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, 
somewhere and somewhen. The whole function of 
philosophy ought to be to find out what definite differ-
ence it will make to you and me, at definite instants of 
our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be 
the true one.34
For James, ideas or facts count as far as they 
make differences in our particular existences, as 
far as they result in different behaviours and expe-
riences for each of us. It is not merely that ideas 
have practical effects in general but, more dramati-
cally, that they have ‘particular consequences’. 
As a philosopher, he addresses the differences 
between, for instance, theism and materialism, or 
monism and pluralism. He considers them first as 
a matter of preference based on personal tempera-
ment, but then develops their respective practical 
and particular consequences, and describes the 
very different world that each of these metaphysical 
options brings about. This might first appear as a 
relativist utilitarianism: everyone freely chooses 
what hypothesis suits them best. But, by insisting 
on the world produced by each term of the alter-
native, James ends always opting for the one that 
is the most inclusive. As a result, he shows how 
demanding the pragmatist method is: 
You must bring out of each word its practical cash-
value, set it at work within the stream of your 
experience. It [the pragmatic method] appears less as 
a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and 
more particularly as an indication of the ways in which 
existing realities may be changed.35
James’s Pragmatism is thus also deeply melio-
ristic. As he himself says, ‘Pragmatism [is] far from 
keeping her eyes bent on the immediate practical 
foreground, as she is accused of doing.’36 Instead, 
Pragmatism adds to our responsibilities the task of 
bringing into existence the long and intricate series 
of consequences, not only of deeds and facts, but 
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ideas. It emphasises their broader consequences 
as well, and thereby encourages us to face the very 
different worlds our choices are unfolding. With 
Dewey especially, Pragmatism also insists on the 
importance of the situations we are necessarily part 
of, and on the necessity to take all their intricacies 
into consideration.40
To conclude, I would like to demonstrate how 
these definitions of Pragmatism can retroactively 
(speculatively) intervene along two lines in the 
debate about criticality: (1) What is the role of theory 
and its relation to practice? (2) Can we look at archi-
tecture’s effects without being mesmerised to such 
extent that we forget about architects’ political and 
social role?
Pragmatism is particularly interesting in dealing 
with the problematic relationship between theory and 
practice, in part because of its ambiguity. Common 
sense makes us think that ‘pragmatism’ favours 
practice over theory, concrete facts and deeds over 
discourse and abstractions. However, contrary to 
what would then be expected of Pragmatism, it has 
nothing to do with a rejection of theoretical knowl-
edge in favour of practice. Instead, it invites one to 
consider abstract conceptions in the light of the prac-
tical differences they make. Pragmatism – unlike 
most post-critical architects – does not put practice 
against theory, but displaces the distinction itself. 
It proposes an instrumental continuum between 
the two, where theories and practices (thoughts 
and deeds) complete each other to reach a given 
objective. While insisting on the practical differ-
ences they both make, Pragmatism emphasises 
the importance of conceptual distinctions. They do 
not diverge only on an intellectual level, but they 
also produce very different worlds, some of which 
are more desirable than others. Pragmatism points 
to these worlds that our conceptions and actions 
bring into existence. By giving importance to these 
worlds, Pragmatism restores the role of both theory 
and practice. There is no need to dismiss theory, the 
‘instrumentalism’. Influenced, like his peers, by 
Darwinism and the theory of evolution, Dewey 
understood ideas as tools used by organisms to 
adapt to their environment. An idea is true only 
insofar as it satisfies the individual, which means 
that it makes his or her relationships to the environ-
ment more fruitful, the experience more fluid. Ideas 
are instruments of adaptation or adjustment. Their 
meaning depends on their ability to meet the condi-
tions involved in a specific situation.
Dewey thus insists – like Peirce and James, 
but in other terms – on the continuity between 
ideas and facts. The distinction between the two 
is purely instrumental: they each play their role 
in the process of establishing knowledge. More 
importantly, Dewey believes ideas should never be 
considered separately from their role in a particular 
experience; abstractions are problematic only as far 
as they are disconnected from the situation in which 
they emerge and from their consequences upon 
that situation.
From its [the instrumental type of logic’s] point of view, 
an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, 
and objective of thought, apart from reference to 
particular position occupied, and particular part played 
in the growth of experience is to reach results which 
are not so much either true or false as they are radi-
cally meaningless because they are considered apart 
from limits. Its results are not only abstractions (for 
all theorizing ends in abstractions), but abstractions 
without possible reference or bearing.38
Dewey thus encourages the adoption of a method 
with which ‘thought would be connected with the 
possibility of action, and every mode of action would 
be reviewed to see its bearing upon the habits and 
ideas from which it sprang’.39
From Peirce to James and Dewey, Pragmatism 
thus not only invites us to consider the practical 
bearings and sensible effects of our actions and 
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issue; what matters is the result. But he insists that 
turning decisively towards the result does not lead 
to the political and moral dissolution of architecture. 
Instead, it forces architects to think of their public 
role. In a Pragmatist fashion, Allen explains that 
meaning is always the result of interactions:
Meaning happens during the encounter of the public 
with the building, not during its design. It is most urgent 
to move away from the private world of the architects 
designing and focus our preoccupations on architec-
ture’s performance in the public sphere.42
If I use Allen’s discourse in the context of this spec-
ulative exercise, it is because Pragmatism leads 
him to propose a posture for architects that better 
takes into account the contingencies of their prac-
tice. Architecture is constrained from the outside: 
architects react to demands and their practice is 
necessarily contingent because it negotiates with 
realities that are complex and uncertain. Architecture 
needs to be ‘agile and responsive’ in order to 
confront these realities. In this sense, Pragmatism 
contributes to the idea that constraints are not 
obstacles against creativity, but opportunities. 
This is precisely where I believe Pragmatism might 
propose a double line of response: Pragmatism 
does not suggest the abolishment of theory nor 
does it imply a focus on architecture’s practical 
effects in a narrow sense: its forms, its materiality… 
Interrogating consequences (rather than mere 
effects) situates architecture in all the intricacies 
that characterise it: elements of context, demands 
to which it has to answer, new elements it brings to 
existence, and so on. The entire world is included 
in the ‘consequences’ that Pragmatism brings to 
the fore. In my view, Pragmatism thus constitutes a 
highly demanding stance, as it constantly requires 
us to ask: what is the world that our design choices 
bring into being, and how can it be better than the 
one we have now?
production of discourse, the practice of research. 
Pragmatism rather encourages us to interrogate 
what they produce and judge them against their 
consequences.
A Pragmatist approach can also amend the 
somewhat reductive focus on architectural effects. 
Since post-critical architecture focuses on how 
architecture acts on the level of effects instead of 
meaning, architects run the risk of losing an impor-
tant critical tool. Being satisfied with material and 
atmospheric effects, with the seductive appearance 
of their architecture, leads architects to neglect the 
broader consequences of architecture, on the site, 
on the users, on the economy, and so on. 
Against that reductive account of effects versus 
meanings, Pragmatism addresses both effects and 
consequences, of both material and discursive 
matters. This is how, for instance, the architect Stan 
Allen interprets James’s notion of Pragmatism at 
‘The Pragmatist Imagination’, and in an essay he 
published that same year: ‘This necessitates a close 
attention to the material effects and worldly conse-
quences of all of architecture’s matter – semantic 
and material – while maintaining a strict indifference 
to the origin of those effects’.41
 The way Stan Allen built on Pragmatism to 
expand on his late 1990s writings about the diagram 
is useful for the speculation I am conducting here: 
he is among the few in the ‘post-critical’ debate 
who seized upon Pragmatism as an opportunity 
to emphasise architects’ responsibility regarding 
the consequences of their practice. The diagram 
is for him a tool to ‘engage with the real’, in all its 
contingencies. In the aforementioned essay, Allen 
does not dismiss theory but the notion of conformity 
to norms, which are established ahead and inde-
pendently of any experimentation. Instead, he 
prefers for increased attention to be paid to the 
consequences. He thus accepts the fact that archi-
tects ‘compromise’, because conformity is not the 
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